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COMMUNAL POLITICS IN MALAYSIAN BORNEO
C. PAUL BRADLEY
University of Michigan, Flint College
HE ENTRY of the peoples of British Borneo into an era of mass politics has
~ been swift, almost entirely compressed in the early years of the 1960’s. Cer-
tain fortuitous factors intervened to accelerate what originally promised to
be a slow-paced process. These were chiefly: (1) the advocacy in May 1961 of an
enlarged Federation of Malaysia by the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul
Rahman, offering the option of independence by adherence to an established state;
(2) the surprising momentum which the Malaysian proposal acquired between
1961-63, partly due to its firm support by British colonial officials in Borneo; and
( 3 ) the availability of existent Malayan political forms, particularly the Alliance
concept of communally based political parties joined together in a governing coali-
tion, which proved transferable to the similarly multi-racial society in Borneo.
The rapid pace of this change was the more noteworthy, since the antecedent
colonial tradition had been strongly authoritarian. Until World War II Sarawak
had been for over a century the personal preserve of James Brooke, the &dquo;White
Rajah,&dquo; and his heirs; North Borneo, known since 1963 as Sabah, had since 1881
represented the last of a dying species, the chartered commercial company. After
the war both had become Crown Colonies with a British governor wielding all sig-
nificant executive authority. Legislative councils with initially limited powers and
restricted electorates were gradually becoming partially popular bodies. Yet within
a period of less than three years, a complex multi-party system emerged in both
territories, functioning by 1963 with the full accouterments of parliamentary democ-
racy. This article will appraise (1) the major features of the evolving Bornean
party system between 1961-63, and (2) the crucial problem of cabinet instability
under communal coalitions in Borneo since the formation of Malaysia in 1963.2 2
BACKGROUND FACTORS IN BORNEAN POLITICS
Race is indisputably the root element in present-day Bornean politics. The
ethnic diversity of both Sarawak and Sabah is almost bewilderingly complex. The
crucial distinctions lie between (1) the indigenous pagan inhabitants, a minority
converted to Christianity by Western missionaries; (2) the Muslim Malays and
Islamized indigenes, sometimes known as &dquo;para-Malays&dquo;; and (3) the immigrant
Chinese. Technically the first two categories are deemed Native and enjoy a privi-
1 The third state in British Borneo, the tiny oil-rich Sultanate of Brunei, chose not to join
Malaysia in 1963; hence political developments there are considered only as they impinge
on Sarawak and Sabah. Brunei once ruled over a large Bornean kingdom, reaching its
culmination in the sixteenth century. The rule of its Malay Sultans had become espe-
cially oppressive when James Brooke entered the Bornean scene.
2 The author has taken two field trips to Malaysia, first in the spring of 1963, again in the
summer of 1965, the latter made possible by a research grant from the University of
Michigan Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies. Acknowledgement is made
of the use of the Sarawak Museum library in Kuching, a valuable depository of public
records and regional newspapers.
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leged constitutional status.3 3 Although most Bornean Chinese are now local-born,
they remain largely an alien element whose ultimate loyalty is ambivalent, part
Bornean, part homeland China, and in varying degrees for different sections of the
Chinese community.
To a significant degree the non-Malay indigenes in the two Bornean states have
a distinctive racial background.4 In Sarawak the Ibans are the largest indigenous
group, accounting for nearly a third of the total population of roughly 800,000
persons. In Sabah the Kadazans, previously known as Dusuns, are numerically the
most important of the indigenes, having nearly one-third of the approximately half-
million inhabitants. With certain exceptions the non-Muslim indigenes are interior
peoples who practice shifting dry-rice cultivation. The Sarawakian Ibans continue
to maintain their traditional long-house communities, the Kadazans in Sabah
decreasingly so.
A small number of the interior peoples has adopted cash-crop agriculture,
mostly in rubber and pepper small-holdings, the latter an important feature of the
economy in Sarawak. Some of the smaller indigenous groups, like the Kayans,
Kenyahs and Kelabits in Sarawak, are related to much larger groups in Indonesian
Borneo but without active intercommunication.
Most Malays and Islamized indigenes live in coastal villages, engage in fishing,
wet-rice cultivation, and the growing of sago. There are, however, numerous Malay
settlements of small traders and farmers in the interior. In Sarawak Malays filled
subordinate administrative posts under the Brooke dynasty and constituted a native
elite. The Malays are a numerically important minority of about 18 per cent in
Sarawak, less numerous in Sabah.
Other important Muslim groups include the Melanaus in Sarawak and the
Bajaus in Sabah. The latter’s ancestors were fierce pirates who infested local waters
until the mid-nineteenth century; today they specialize in cattle-raising and are
known as skilled horsemen. Practitioners of Islam appear to have a considerably
higher status than non-Muslims, due partly to the prestige of the ancient Brunei
Sultanate, the original source of Muslim culture in Borneo.
Large-scale Chinese immigration was systematically encouraged by the British
to facilitate the economic exploitation of Borneo. In Sarawak the Chinese now con-
stitute approximately one-third of the total population, in Sabah nearly a fourth.
In the two states combined, they are, significantly, the largest single racial group.
Now regarded as permanent settlers, the Chinese are local-born to an increasing
degree - 80 per cent in Sarawak, 77 per cent in Sabah. Like Malayan Chinese,
they dominate the non-European economy. Concentrated chiefly but not exclu-
sively in urban areas, they penetrate nearly every sector of the economy, including
trade, market gardening, timber concessions and export businesses.
3 Actually Malays were originally migrants, as they continue to be to a lesser extent, from
Malaya, Indonesia and Brunei. Certain ethnic specialists employ the term "para-Malay"
to describe pagan indigenes that adopt a Malay style of living and embrace Islam.
4 The 1960 Government census reports for the two states are valuable sources of a wide range
of statistical information. Both reports were conducted by L. W. Jones, Superintendent
of Census for both territories, and were separately published in 1962. Also useful as
sources of general information are the Annual Reports for Sarawak and North Borneo,
published by the colonial administration until 1963.
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As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Chinese in Borneo devoted intensive efforts
to establishing their own China-oriented schools, and now enjoy a marked educa-
tional advantage over the indigenes. Typically, ten times as many Bornean Chinese
youth complete secondary education as those of the indigenous peoples. In the early
1960’s Sarawakian Chinese attained a 53 per cent rate of literacy compared to the
indigenous rate of 13 per cent; in Sabah, the Chinese were 54 per cent literate,
the indigenes, 17. In the postwar period the Chinese secondary schools in Sarawak
were an important stimulus for radically inclined Chinese youth, some of whom
were attracted to the developing Communist organization there.
Each year the small populations in the two states undergo a 3-3.5 per cent
increase. They have a strikingly youthful composition, over 40 per cent of the total
population being under 15 years of age; over half the Chinese segment is in this
category. Significantly the Chinese minorities in both Sarawak and Sabah grow
proportionately faster than the indigenous groups. For example, between 1947 and
1960 the Sarawakian Chinese increased by 57.9 per cent compared to the 28.3 per
cent of the indigenes, the Chinese death rate being considerably lower.
Two distinct levels of racial tension are present in these multi-racial societies.
Frictions exist between the local Malays and non-Muslim indigenes. In Sarawak
they are heightened by the supercilious attitude toward the &dquo;natives’’ that prevails
among the Malays, as a one-time privileged caste under the Brookes. Both groups,
however, are fearful of the ever-expanding economic power of the Chinese and their
anticipated numerical preponderance, especially in Sarawak.
Not all social tensions in Borneo can be attributed to ethnic divisions. A
degree of conventional class antagonism arises between employers and workers, espe-
cially as projected by the developing trade union movement in Kuching. Among
the Chinese the use of various dialects, deriving from their diverse places of origin
in China, is divisive. In Sarawak, for example, seven Chinese dialects are employed.
As among Singapore Chinese, a wide gap exists between the Chinese educated in
English-language schools and graduates of Chinese-language schools. In Sabah a
minority of Chinese has intermarried with local Kadazans, and appears well assimi-
lated in Kadazan areas of rural Sabah, an interesting deviation from the norm of
Chinese clannishness.
The economies of Sarawak and Sabah largely conform to the classical pattern
of developing states: ( 1 ) concentration on a small number of primary products;
(2) domination of foreign trade by a few key exports; (3) periodic fluctuation in
the market price of these exports, constituting an element of chronic instability in
their economies; (4) heavy reliance of government revenues on export duties, also
variable from year to year; and (5) a critical dependence on certain imports, espe-
cially foodstuffs.5 5
Nearly 40 per cent of the Sarawakian economy is devoted to export produc-
tion, principally rubber, timber, and pepper. Most of these products are shipped
5 Recent economic data on the Bornean states can be obtained from their respective State
Development Plans as follows: (1) Sarawak Development Plan 1964-68, Kuching,
1963; (2) Sabah Development Plan 1965-70, State of Sabah, Malaysia. Both were
designed to be incorporated into a larger Malaysian Development Plan, announced in
1966.
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to the entrep6t port of Singapore for wider distribution. Of secondary importance
is the oil refinery maintained in Sarawak by Brunei oil producers.
The economy of Sabah is at present highly bouyant. Following the destruc-
tive hiatus of the Japanese occupation, the economy enjoyed a remarkable boom
in the 1950’s, especially in the expanding timber industry. Its less favorable con-
comitants have been a severe inflation and a chronic labor shortage. Interestingly,
Japan has become the leading purchaser of Sabahan exports, absorbing nearly half
of the total and recently 80 per cent of timber exports. Rubber and copra are also
important exports. Sabah’s foreign trade is oriented toward Hong Kong and the
Far East rather than Singapore.
In both states the working population is overwhelmingly engaged in agricul-
tural production - over three quarters in Sarawak, about 80 per cent in Sabah.
Large numbers are engaged in padi production, rice being the preferred staple food.
Neither state being self-sufficient in rice production, imports are required to fill
about a third of total domestic requirements.
Bornean systems of communication remain primitive. Sarawak’s few roads are
found mostly in such urban centers as Kuching and Sibu; river transportation
remains vitally important for the interior peoples. In Sabah the important trade
centers on the West and East Coasts as yet have no overland link, although tor-
tuously slow progress is reported on a connecting road. The operations of the single
railroad on the West Coast are hampered by intermittent landslides. Obviously the
paucity of communications delays a development of a statewide political conscious-
ness transcending established ethnic loyalties.
THE FORMATIVE PHASE (1961-63)
Prior to 1961 political stirrings were largely confined to Sarawak. The Federa-
tion of Malaya had become independent in 1957. Singapore acquired internal
self-government in 1959. Indonesia had been politically activist for the whole post-
war period. But Sarawak remained a political backwater.
The Sarawak constitution, promulgated in 1956 after four years of dilatory
preparation, marked a modest advance toward wider local participation in govern-
ment. Several of its features require comment.6 For the first time the so-called
Unofficials held a legislative majority in the Council Negri, with 24 representatives
in a 45-man body. Rather than owing their seats to the governor’s nomination, they
were now elected under a complicated three-tier election system. Only at the local
level did a restricted number of voters choose the members of District Advisory
Councils. From their own numbers the District Councillors then elected the mem-
bers of five Divisional Advisory Councils, the Divisions comprising the Colony’s
principal administrative units. Finally the Divisional Councillors, joining those of
urban Councils in Kuching, Sibu and Miri, selected the 24 Unofficials (later raised
to 36) of the Council Negri from their own ranks. The element of popular partici-
pation was small, since only rate-paying householders could vote in District elec-
6 The constitutional summation in the tome edited by L. A. Sheridan, Malaya and Singapore
&mdash; The Borneo Territories: The Development of the Laws and Constitutions (London:
Stevens, 1961), is legalistic. A more realistic analysis is found in Liang Kim Bang,
Sarawak; 1941-57, No. 5 in the University of Singapore’s "Studies on Borneo and
Malaya," 1964, pp. 19-21.
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tions. In Sabah the nominated element in its Legislative Council persisted until the
eve of Sabah’s adherence to Malaysia.’ Belatedly in 1963, an indirect election sys-
tem similar to Sarawak’s was introduced in Sabah.&dquo;
The original Cession decision in 1946 marks the beginning of popular political
controversy in Sarawak. In the view of the last White Rajah, Charles Vyner
Brooke, the financial burden of reconstruction and modernization in war-torn
Sarawak would be onerous. An ancillary influence on the Rajah’s judgment was
his known distrust of his presumptive heir, Anthony Brooke. He proceeded to nego-
tiate the transfer of his family dominion to Colonial Office administration, precipi-
tating a bitter dispute in Sarawak. Many Malays and Ibans opposed Cession, and
favored the retention of a regime whose beneficiaries they had been.9 An influential
Malay faction, enjoying the support of the prestigious Datu Bandar, and also the
Chinese supported Cession. Under the Colonial Office the Chinese anticipated
more equitable treatment and an expansion of trade contacts with Chinese Singa-
pore and Hong Kong, also Crown Colonies.
To advance the anti-Cession cause, its Malay leadership made effective use of
an existent Malay National Union, organized in 1939 for primarily social purposes.
The principal argument this group advanced was that Sarawak already enjoyed
the equivalent of independence under the personal rule of the Rajah, and accepting
Colonial Office tutelage would constitute a step backward; its validity was dubious,
for Sarawak had been under formal British protection since 1888. To protest the
advent of Colonial Office control, many Malay bureaucrats resigned. In Decem-
ber 1949 the agitation came to a climax with the assassination of the British Gov-
ernor by a Malay extremist. Even after this conflict receded, friction between the
opposing Malay factions persisted, and in the early 1960’s they formed two rival
parties.
After the war the Sarawakian Chinese were politically in a transitional stage.
Before 1941 the Government tended to consider the Chinese community a sepa-
rate, largely autonomous entity. The system of Kapitan Chinas with quasi-official
authority had been devised to maintain limited contact between the Government
and the Chinese. Its rationale was that no European administrator (or Malay
subordinate) could understand the complexities of Chinese society. Skill in acquir-
ing material goods became the principal criterion for selecting the Kapitans. During
the war they acquired an unsavory reputation for collaboration with the Japanese
Occupation, so that in the eyes of the Chinese, the old system of indirect control
became thoroughly discredited. Many Chinese, especially the students in Chinese
7 Nominated elements in Bornean legislatures, which were designed to represent various cor-
porate bodies and ethnic groups, helped to sustain communal divisions.
8 Sabah Annual Report 1963 (State of Sabah: Government Printer, 1964), pp. 217-20.
Sabah had four Residencies, the middle tier in its electoral system, which were the
equivalent of the 5 Divisions in Sarawak. A system of Local Authorities had been gradu-
ally expanding in Sabah since 1952. Information regarding postwar political develop-
ments in Sabah is found in M. H. Baker’s North Borneo, The First Ten Years, 1946-
1956, No. 1 in the Singapore "Studies on Borneo and Malaya," Singapore, 1962. An
impressionistic account of postwar changes is given in the well-written Corona Library
volume on North Borneo by K. C. Tregonning (London: H.M.S.O., 1960).
9 Liang’s interpretation of the Anti-Cession Movement is that a long-privileged governing
class (the Malays) was engaged in an act of political self-preservation, op. cit., pp.
5-13.
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schools, began an active search for fresh leadership, more in tune with postwar
Asian political trends. An increasing number turned to affiliation with the extreme
Left.
In this fluid atmosphere there appeared in 1959 the first well-organized politi-
cal party, the Sarawak United People’s party (SUPP). The party’s major objec-
tives were attaining Sarawak’s independence, a system of parliamentary democracy,
and ill-defined socialism. Pledged to the fostering of racial harmony in Sarawak
and self consciously multi-racial in its membership recruitment, SUPP was pre-
dominantly a Chinese party, although initially attracting considerable support from
non-Malay indigenous groups, particularly Ibans. In SUPP branches, the key post
of secretary was often held by a Chinese with an indigene serving as chairman.&dquo;’
Significantly, SUPP led the protest of the Chinese community against Govern-
ment’s policy of requiring the use of English in all Government-aided schools.
Articulation of SUPP’s program was dominated by its two principal leaders,
Ong Kee Hui and Stephen K. T. Yong. Ong, whose grandfather was the ranking
Kapitan China under the last Rajah Brooke, was a prominent banker, leading
member of the Kuching Municipal Council, a thoroughly bourgeois political leader;
Yong, an articulate Chinese lawyer. While Yong appears to hold views slightly to
the left of Ong, both are moderates, who stressed constitutional means of attaining
the party’s goals.
A moderate-radical cleavage developed in SUPP, strikingly similar to the earlier
factional split in the People’s Action party in Singapore.&dquo; SUPP’s pro-Communist,
radical faction, led by certain trade unionists in Kuching, acquired wide influence
in SUPP branches. The colonial Administration believed SUPP to be subject to
continuous infiltration by the &dquo;Clandestine Communist Organization&dquo; (CCO a
label devised by the Special Branch of the police to cover the Communist move-
ment’s manifold activities. 12
As a counter to SUPP, a second political party was formed in early 1960, the
Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS) .13 Originally the party attracted multi-racial
support, including prominent leaders from both Malay and Iban communities. The
10 See Michael B. Leigh, The Chinese Community of Sarawak: A Study of Communal Rela-
tions, No. 6 in Singapore "Studies on Malaysia," Singapore, 1964. Leigh reports that
in 1962 all but three of 16 SUPP branches had native chairmen.
11 See the author’s appraisal, "Leftist Fissures in Singapore Politics," Western Political Quar-
terly, 18 (June 1965, Part 1), 292-308. As in PAP, English-educated Chinese were
prominent in SUPP’s moderate faction; Chinese-educated Chinese in the radical wing.
12 See the Government’s White Paper, The Danger Within: A History of the Clandestine Com-
munist Organization in Sarawak (1963). It traces the development of the local Com-
munist movement from its obscure origins as the "Sarawak Anti-Fascist League" during
World War II. Considerable attention is given a captured GCO document, which pur-
portedly established the party line on collaboration with SUPP. According to the direc-
tive, "our party &mdash; the Sarawak United People’s Party &mdash; embraces all races. Though
led by the propertied class, we can still make use of them at the present stage.... We
should make use of these prominent figures to deceive the British imperialists, preventing
them from perceiving the true face of our party.... We should make use of it when it is
useful and attack it when it becomes useless." The Danger Within, p. 28. The import
of the White Paper was to portray SUPP as little more than a Communist "front"
organization. This analysis distorts the gravity of the internal conflict in SUPP and the
staying power of the moderate leadership.
13 PANAS’ chairman, the Datu Bandar, later acknowledged that his party was deliberately
formed to oppose SUPP, "Sarawak by the Week," Government Information Service, No.
17/63.
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Datu Bandar, Abang Haji Mustapha, however, assumed the dominant leadership
role, and PANAS subsequently became the vehicle of the Cessionist Malay faction.
Prior to 1961 widely divergent groups advanced tentative proposals for unifica-
tion of British Borneo. In 1958 British colonial officials initiated wide discussions
of a Closer Association project, enabling its two Bornean territories and protectorate
of Brunei to advance toward self-government under common institutions. Its
advocates stressed certain positive integrative elements. The area shared a common
lingua franca in Malay and a common currency. A degree of economic comple-
mentarity between Brunei and Sarawak derived from the processing and re-ship-
ment of Brunei oil in Sarawak. A large number of administrative officials in Brunei
was trained in Sarawak. All three states had been under British protection since
1888. But their conflicts of interest proved controlling. Brunei was reluctant to
share its rich oil revenues with its two poorer neighbors. Sabah, free of serious
internal subversion, was alarmed by the growing CCO influence in Sarawak. In
both Sarawak and Sabah the non-Muslim indigenes feared the numerically strength-
ened position which both Malays and Chinese would enjoy in a Bornean federation.
A radically different formulation was voiced by A. M. Azahari, the volatile
nationalist leader in Brunei, whose Party Ra’ayat, formed in the late 1950’s, had
won wide popular response. In 1959 the Sultan of Brunei had taken the first hesi-
tant step to move his feudal state toward representative government. A constitu-
tion was instituted, which established a Legislative Council, 16 of whose 33 mem-
bers were to be elected. 1-4 The Party Ra’ayat subsequently won easy control of all
16 seats. Azahari’s ambition was to restore Brunei’s ancient grandeur and reabsorb
its former territories. As a first step he called for the return of adjacent Limbang
district in Sarawak, the last Brunei territory to be annexed by the White Rajahs.
Interestingly, the advocacy of a Bornean federation was a doctrinal point of coinci-
dence between the Party Ra’ayat and SUPP. For Azahari, the overtones were
strongly Malay 15 SUPP envisioned an interracial union.
The Malaysian proposal in 1961 provided the main impetus for a whole array
of new political parties in both Sarawak and Sabah and their integration into a
parliamentary system. The intricate relationship between the Federation of Malaya
and Singapore, whose independence was imminent, formed the essential back-
ground for Tunku Abdul Rahman’s suggestion. 16
In 1961 the pro-Communist radical faction in the Singapore PAP threatened
to take over the party, although the moderates under Lee Kuan Yew still controlled
the Government. The conservative, Malay-dominated Alliance Government of
Malaya faced the unpalatable prospect of an extreme leftist cabal governing inde-
pendent Singapore. Alarmist analogies with Castro’s Cuba were precipitately
14 Sheridan, op. cit., pp. 120-23. Contemporaneously Brunei made a new treaty arrangement
with Britain, under which a High Commissioner would replace the former British Resi-
dent, and Britain retained control over Brunei’s external affairs.
15 Azahari was of mixed Arab-Malay parentage, hence technically an alien, and ineligible to
lead his party in legislative elections.
16 A considerable literature on the formation of Malaya exists. Three of the briefer accounts
are: Emily Sadka, "Malaysia: The Political Background," The Political Economy of
Independent Malaya (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1963) ; Gordon P. Means,
"Malaysia &mdash; A New Federation in Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, 36 ( Summer 1963)
and the author’s "The Formation of Malaysia," Current History (February 1964).
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drawn. If merger with Singapore were quickly arranged under joint auspices with
PAP moderates, then the Malayan Alliance would presumably control the central
government, and most importantly, internal security.
The delicate Malay-Chinese demographic balance in Malaya would be imper-
iled by absorption of overwhelmingly Chinese Singapore. If, however, the mixed
populations of Borneo were included, Chinese preponderance would be forestalled
and continued Malay governmental control insured, at least for a considerable time.
All three units of British Borneo were invited to adhere to the new state. The
scheme plainly (and unjustifiably) assumed an identity of interests between penin-
sular Malays and the indigenous peoples in Borneo vis-a-vis the Chinese.
An important supplementary security consideration was involved. A &dquo;greater
Malaysia,&dquo; with its five constituent units enjoying the highest regional economic
prosperity, would be a far more defensible entity against possible future encroach-
ment by Communist China than three or four smaller, isolated states. The original
proposal was almost casually enunciated and subsequently implemented in record
time.
The original Bornean reaction was mixed, splitting largely along communal
lines. The local Malays and Islamized indigenes quickly endorsed the Malaysian
proposal. They supported a strong central government under Federation, Islam as
the national religion, and Malay as the national language.
While a minority of the non-Muslim indigenes preferred to retain British
colonial rule, the majority was willing to accept Malaysia, if certain safeguards for
its various groups could be assured. The selection of Heads of State in Sarawak and
Sabah, it was argued, should be restricted to indigenes, who would also be eligible
for appointment as Head of the Federation. They were opposed to Islam as a state
religion, wanted English to remain an official language in Borneo, and favored
reserving state civil service posts for Borneans, as soon as they could be trained by
British expatriates.
Most Bomean Chinese were decidedly cool to the Malaysian proposal and
preferred the option of independent Bornean states or a Bornean federation. Their
principal fear was that the Alliance’s Malay political leaders in Kuala Lumpur
would dominate subordinate Borneo and discriminate against the Chinese. Like
the non-Muslim indigenes, they opposed Islam as a state religion and wanted
English retained as an official language. While they were willing that indigenes be
given special educational opportunities due to their backward position, the Chinese
opposed constitutional status for such privileges. All three groups wanted the Bor-
nean states granted control over their own immigration and favorably weighted
representation in the Federal Parliament. 17
Between 1961 and 1963 a common developmental pattern marked the emer-
gence of unstable party systems in both Sarawak and Sabah. Its major character-
istics were as follows:
" This spread of opinion was reported by the Cobbold Commission, comprised of British and
Malayan representatives, that visited Borneo in 1962. Its report is also a useful source
of information on the first political parties in Sarawak and Sabah. See Report of the
Commission of Inquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, Kuala Lumpur, 1962.
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1. The f undamentally communal character of party structures. Despite the
multi-racial origins of several parties, the basic ethnic component of all parties was
clearly identifiable by 1963. In Sarawak the ethnic breakdown was as follows:
A specific causation is ascertainable for the diminution in the multi-racial
character which SUPP and PANAS in particular originally exemplified. The close
link between SUPP’s radical faction and the CCO, eventually carried to the extreme
of collaboration in Indonesia’s &dquo;confrontation&dquo; campaign against Malaysia in 1963,
alienated an increasing number of SUPP’s Iban supporters. The somewhat erratic
policy shifts which the Datu Bandar intermittently imposed on PANAS were an
important factor in driving a number of its original followers into new party forma-
tions. Increasingly PANAS became the voice of a single Malay faction.
An important causative factor in the formation of two separate Iban parties
was the geographic division of the Iban community, each with its own traditional
leaders. Ibans in the Second Division affiliated with SNAP, those in the Third
Division comprised the bulk of PAPAS’ support; each party apparently agreed to
respect the other’s base region.
The Chinese community was very unevenly divided. Most workers, smaller
entrepreneurs, and younger Chinese between 17 and 24, many of whom had
attended Chinese-medium schools, were attracted to SUPP. The much smaller
SCA represented middle-class and upper-income Chinese businessmen and some of
the older generation of Chinese; English-educated Chinese dominated its leadership.
The ethnic divisions in the somewhat less fragmented Sabah party system
were as follows:
UNKO was consistently the most determinedly multi-racial of Sabahan parties
in its policy statements and membership recruitment. Though basically a Kadazan
party, UNKO attracted significant Sino-Kadazan support. Its organizer and prin-
cipal leader, Donald Stephens, was himself an Anglo-Kadazan. In USNO the most
important determinant of membership was adherence to the Muslim religion, espe-
cially among the Bajaus and the several Malay groups. While Pasok Momogun had
Murut leadership, it drew substantial support from dissident Kadazans, who
rejected UNKO; Muruts and Kadazans are ethnically related. Kadazans in the
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interior tended to support Pasok Momogun, those in the developed coastal areas,
UNKO.
2. A very marked tendency for initially anti-Malaysia parties to shift at variable
intervals to varying degrees of support for Malaysia. As already indicated, non-
Muslim groups tended to be originally hostile or lukewarm to the Malaysian pro-
posal ; by 1963, SUPP was the only remaining, clearly anti-Malaysia party. A
complex of factors account for this substantial movement of opinion.
The Malayan Government invited a large number of Bomean political leaders
to Kuala Lumpur for briefing sessions and tours that featured impressive Rural
Development projects, sponsored by the Alliance Government; it was made plain
that if Borneo joined Malaysia, it could expect a similar program. UNKO’s
Stephens and SNAP’s Iban leader, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, were among the
visitors who soon adopted a pro-Malaysia position.
In 1962 a contingent of Bornean legislators joined British and Malayan repre-
sentatives to form an Inter-Governmental Committee, chaired by Lord Lansdowne,
to consider details of the pending Federation. Its recommendations removed most
of the original objections raised by critics of Malaysian Islam would be the
national religion of Malaysia, but not of the Bornean states. Malay would be the
national language; but for at least ten years English would remain an ofhcial lan-
guage and thereafter until the Bornean legislatures decided otherwise. Bornean
indigenes would receive preference in civil service positions. The Bomean states
would retain a large degree of autonomy over education and immigration; in the
Federal parliament their small populations would receive favorably weighted repre-
sentation, Sarawak being granted 24 seats, Sabah 16.19
Finally the abortive Brunei revolt by Azahari’s Party Ra’ayat in December
1962 consolidated Bomean support for Malaysia.2° The revolt, quelled by aid of
British troops, raised the specter of a new era of Brunei domination. It also served
as a catalytic agent, converting Indonesia’s original acquiescence in the formation
of Malaysia into its harsh policy of confrontation. Many Borneans now acquired
a fresh appreciation for an umbrella of Anglo-Malayan military support that
Malaysia would afford.21 Finally, as the formation of Malaysia appeared increas-
ingly imminent, opportunistic calculations of future advantage led certain laggard
groups, like Pasok Momogun and BUNAP in Sabah, belatedly to endorse the new
Federation.
3. A fissiparous tendency seen in the formation of a number of splinter parties,
partially counteracted by limited amalgamation. The fragmentation process was
mainly noticeable in Sarawak, as BARJASA and PAPAS were formed by PANAS
dissidents; to a much smaller extent, SCA was a splinter off SUPP. The PANAS
18 Malaysia Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee 1962 (Federation of Malaya: Gov-
ernment Printer, 1963).
19 More populous Singapore was granted only 15 seats in the Federal House, mainly due to
the autonomy granted it in labor and education.
20 An interesting account of the revolt is given in Arnold C. Brackman’s Southeast Asia’s Sec-
ond Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago (New York: Praeger, 1966),
pp. 139ff. The revolt received considerable support in adjacent areas in Sarawak and
a small area in Sabah.
21 The Filipino claim to Sabah, vigorously advanced in 1963, had a similarly cohesive effect on
pro-Malaysia parties in Sabah.
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splinter parties reflected a hardening in communal lines. A reverse fusion process
was seen in the formation of BUNAP in Sabah, when the Democratic and United
parties, both Chinese, combined. Here the Chinese realized that political division
weakened their minority position.
4. Initial predominance of traditional leaders in new party organizations. In
the rapid proliferation of essentially communal parties, established tribal leaders
inevitably held key positions. Leading examples were the founder of PAPAS,
Temenggong Jugah anak Barieng, and in Sabah, Pasak Momogun’s O.K.K. Sun-
dang. In Muslim parties there was a similar trend, the Datu Bandar in PANAS,
and in Sabah the leader of USNO, Datu Mustapha bin Datu Harun, being exam-
ples. A contributing factor to the paucity of leadership alternatives was the con-
siderable number of well-educated civil servants in both states, cut off by their status
from party politics.
To the traditionalist norm there were noteworthy variations. With the exten-
sion of local government in the 1950’s, new political reputations were established,
as that of Ong Kee Hui in Sarawak. A few leaders arose from occupationally
obscure origins, like SNAP’s Ningkam, a former medical dresser. At the secondary
tier of leadership an ambitious group of youthful leaders soon emerged, like
UNKO’s Peter J. Mojuntin and in Sarawak, BARJASA’s Taib bin Mahmud and
PAPAS’s Penghulu Francis Umpau.
5. An assertion of nationalist claims by a number of indigenous parties,
advanced in certain policy statements and the very names of several indigenous
parties, as the Iban-dominated Sarawak National party and the Muslim United
Sabah National Organization. Such claims assumed that a self-appointed indigenous
group epitomized the whole social organism, its pre-eminence to be properly
acknowlged by other ethnic communities, especially the alien Chinese. Their asser-
tion stimulated the Chinese, particularly in Sabah, to counter-organization.
6. The formation of inter-racial Alliances on the Malayan pattern by the pro-
Malaysia parties.&dquo; In a racially fragmented society the utility of an interracial
coalition to attenuate recurrent ethnic conflicts was apparent. In the Bornean
Alliances, common commitment to Malaysia proved an indispensable integrative
element. In Sarawak the Iban parties, SNAP and PAPAS, first formed a united
front, subsequently joined by the two Malay parties, PANAS and BARJASA, and
by SCA. In Sabah UNKO assumed leadership in a similar grouping with USNO,
which BUNAP and PMP joined. A numerically insignificant Sabah Indian Con-
22 The Malayan Alliance party (MAP), formed between 1952-55, had as its leading com-
ponents, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese
Association (MCA), supported by the much smaller Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).
Initially MAP was an electoral combination; since independence in 1957, it has con-
stituted a fairly effective, moderately progressive Government. Its leading Malay mem-
bers have been Prime Minister Rahman and his Deputy, Tun Razak; the able Tan Siew
Sin, head of MCA, Minister of Finance.
MAP’s essential purpose is to provide a workable mechanism for mediating and
compromising opposing demands of its communal partners, usually by means of behind-
closed-doors discussions. Despite persisting differences over the status of Chinese-medium
education, MAP has functioned with considerable success, suffering only one major exo-
dus by dissident Chinese. MAP, however, had a prolonged gestation period and assumed
a governmental role only after the British had defeated the main thrust of the Com-
munist insurgency.
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gress was also afflliated. The Malayan Alliance party (MAP) encouraged these
pro-Malaysia formations, not only because hopefully they would enhance the new
Federation’s internal stability but also allow MAP to forge a pan-Malaysian Grand
Alliance to facilitate control of its Bornean afflliates. The mainland MCA was
especially aggressive in prodding Bornean Chinese to form counterpart organiza-
tions, apparently to the excessive degree in Sarawak of alienating a number of
Chinese.
Even before the sequence of Council elections in Sarawak in 1963, the fragile
character of its new Alliance was indicated. PANAS abruptly withdrew, partly in
resentment against MAP’s interference in Sarawak Alliance matters, and later estab-
lished liaison with the anti-Malaysia SUPP to avoid being shut out of representa-
tion on Council Negri.
Several features of the pre-Malaysian elections require comment.23 Both Alli-
ances scored impressive electoral victories, paving the way for Alliance coalition
Governments with the advent of Malaysia. The elections confirmed the communal
character of Bornean political parties with a striking correlation between ethnic
percentages in certain districts and the electoral showing of the corresponding com-
munal party. The indirect system resulted in a certain distortion in the electorate’s
preferences expressed at the local level. For example, in Sarawak, SUPP received
24.5 per cent of the District Council vote, but held only 5 of the 36 elective seats
in the Council Negri; even this allocation was due to its makeshift alliance with
PANAS. In both District and Divisional Electoral Colleges a considerable amount
of inter-party bargaining was necessary to determine distribution of legislative seats.
In Sabah, the Muslim USNO emerged as the strongest single party in the Alliance
occurred, most frequently between UNKO and Pasok Momogun. This indicated a
limited degree of consensus within its Alliance.
From these early elections, the Sarawak Alliance appeared chiefly as an Iban
party with limited Malay support. The dissident PANAS made a considerably
better showing than its Malay competitor, BARJASA. The SCA proved a negligi-
ble element, with the Opposition SUPP winning overwhelming Chinese support.
In Sabah, the Muslim USNO emerged as the strongest single party in the Alliance
but with UNKO in a strong second position, subsequently improved by its merger
in 1964 with Pasok Momogun, which united the Kadazan community.
PATTERNS OF CABINET INSTABILITY ( 1963-66)
In contrast to their Malayan model, the governing Alliances in Sarawak and
Sabah proved unstable, crisis-ridden coalitions. Between Malaysia Day in Septem-
ber 1963 and mid-1966, both suffered two major crises, ending in the dislodgment
of their respective Chief Ministers, Ningkan in Sarawak, Stephens in Sabah. In
both states the crises resulted in a major shift in the relative power positions of each
coalition’s members, with certain parties of the non-Muslim indigenes, SNAP in
23 These have been analyzed in some detail in Robert O. Tilman’s "Elections in Sarawak,"
Asian Survey (October 1963), and H. R. Glick, "The Chinese Community in Sabah and
the 1963 Election," Asian Survey (March 1965) ; they have been placed in a wider
context in Tilman’s "The Alliance Pattern in Malaysian Politics: Bornean Variations
on a Theme," South Atlantic Quarterly (Winter 1964).
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Sarawak and UPKO in Sabah/4 subjected to a considerable diminution in influ-
ence. In Sarawak a so-called &dquo;Native Alliance&dquo; between the militantly Malay
BARJASA and the communally minded younger leadership in the second Iban
party, PAPAS, challenged SNAP, with its multi-racial outlook, and its leader, Ning-
kan, with his suspiciously close links to British expatriate civil servants. Typically,
PANAS did not play a consistent role in the Sarawak disputes, first allying with the
&dquo;nativists,&dquo; later siding with SNAP. In Sabah the Chinese party, playing a kind
of balancer role, emerged as an immediate beneficiary of the basic rivalry between
the Kadazan UPKO and Muslim USNO, at the end of 1964 when Peter Lo
replaced Stephens as Chief Minister. 25
In addition to inducing internal power realignments, the Bornean crises had
these noteworthy characteristics:
1. An apparent predominance of party organs over Government bodies in their
respective crisis roles, without, however) a sharp differentiation. With minor devia-
tions the usual developmental sequence in a given crisis was as follows: initiation
of a controversial Government policy or appointment, which precipitated the dis-
pute ; ensuing inter-party haggling, usually carried on outside the parliamentary
arena; the threat of parliamentary motions of non-confidence against the chal-
lenged Chief Minister; the use of party bodies, both local and federal, in behind-
closed-doors attempts to mediate the dispute and prevent dissolution of the Alli-
ance ; and either deferring a decisive resolution of the conflict by a relatively minor
Cabinet rearrangement, or alternatively, registering an apparently final settlement
by party ratification of a major Cabinet reshuflle.
2. Complication of the substantive disputes by the personality factor. The
exacerbating role of jarring personalities was especially marked in Sabah, where the
Chief Minister, UPKO’s Stephens, and the Head of State, the USNO leader, Tun
Mustapha, strongly disagreed on their respective constitutional roles. In Sarawak
a policy dispute over proposed land legislation was utilized and perhaps provoked
by several leaders to support their thrust for political advancement, as notably in
the case of BARJASA’s Taib, who, it was widely believed, aspired to succeed Ning-
kan as Chief Minister.
3. Reliance on UMNO leaders in the mainland MAP to play the decisive
mediatory role, underscoring the clearly subordinate position of the Bornean Alli-
ances. Frequent shuttlings between the Bornean capitals and Kuala Lumpur char-
acterized each crisis, with the two principal UMNO leaders, Rahman and Razak,
sometimes holding separate audiences for the various Bornean factions. While both
UMNO leaders repeatedly professed their neutrality between opposing sides and
primary concern with preserving Alliance unity, UMNO appeared at times to play
24 After several months of private negotiations between UNKO and PM, their merger as the
United Pasokmomogun Kadazan Organization (UPKO) was announced in April, 1964.
Stephens and Sundang served temporarily as joint chairmen.
25 Sabah’s pre-Malaysian Chinese party, BUNAP, later changed its name to the Sabah National
party (SANAP). In early 1965 the proposal to merge SANAP with the Sabah Chinese
Association, hitherto essentially a social welfare organization, provoked criticism from
some Chinese, who opposed the formation of a single Chinese political organization.
Chief Minister Lo was subsequently chosen chairman of the reorganized Sabah Chinese
Association (SCA). This new party reinforced the pervasive communalism in Sabah
politics.
136
a protective role on behalf of its Bornean counterparts, BARJASA and to a lesser
extent PANAS in Sarawak, USNO in Sabah.26 The relative decline of the non-
Muslim indigenous parties provides partial circumstantial evidence. In both states
the challenged indigene Chief Ministers, Ningkan in Sarawak and Stephens in
Sabah, adopted states’-rights postures, resentful of UMNO’s intervention as prej-
udicial to their own parties’ interests. Ningkan in particular posited the alterna-
tive of having the State Alliance’s Council, as an autonomous body, settle its own
internal disputes. With heavy reliance by the Bornean states on the central Govern-
ment for military defense and financial assistance for economic development, the
interest of federal party bodies in Bornean matters could scarcely be ignored.
Further evidence of UMNO’s involvement in Bornean politics was seen in the
pressure it exerted on Muslim parties there to convert themselves into UMNO
branches, further strengthening the Malay component in MAP. In turn the power
of the UMNO-dominated Central Government would be enhanced. A deterrent
to fusion of Muslim parties was the multi-racial professions of Bornean parties, as
by USNO in Sabah, partly based on their desire for a wide local base. A trouble-
some prerequisite in Sarawak was the necessity of a prior merger by PANAS and
BARJASA, intermittently reported as imminent, but consummated only in 1967.
Despite a marked parallelism in the evolving Bornean Alliances, there were
distinguishing features in their respective political environments. While both states
from early 1963 were directly threatened by Indonesian armed incursions, Sarawak
bore the brunt of border raids. A significant number of young Sarawakian Chinese
under CCO discipline crossed into Indonesian Kalimantan for instruction in guer-
rilla tactics, some of these subsequently leading raiding parties back into Sarawak
settlements personally familiar to them.27 Sabah’s less radical Chinese community
spared its Alliance Government a similarly acute problem of internal subversion.
Unlike Sabah, the Sarawak Alliance Government was confronted with a for-
midable parliamentary Opposition, provided chiefly by SUPP and to a lesser extent
by PANAS. Its effectiveness was chiefly seen in the searching questions SUPP legis-
lators raised in Council Negri debates and SUPP’s publicizing of the Alliance’s
recurrent internal frictions, subjecting them to a critical running commentary.
Internal fissures in SUPP were in turn, however, exploited by the Government.
Attention was forcefully drawn to certain SUPP branches allegedly under CCO
discipline, although the effects of these attacks were blunted by declarations of
loyalty to the new Federation by SUPP’s dominant moderate leaders following
Malaysia Day in 1963. Finally, the emergency powers of the central Government
were in cooperation with the Sarawak Government employed to proscribe certain
SUPP branches and prohibit large public meetings of a political character.
In Sabah there was no formal Opposition. In its stead, worsening frictions
between UPKO and USNO created an unsystematic, de facto intra-Alliance Oppo-
26 In 1963 UMNO had insisted on Muslim Heads of State in Borneo, if non-Muslim indigenes
served as Chief Ministers.
27 Imprecise, but probably conservative official estimates held that approximately a thousand
Sarawakian Chinese youth had defected since Malaysia Day. The loyalty to Malaysia of
a large number of Chinese farmers in the First Division bordering Kalimantan was
dubious in the extreme.
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sition. When UPKO’s Stephens was Chief Minister, UPKO was subjected to a
restricted cross-fire from USNO, these positions being reversed after Stephens was
relieved in 1964. An important policy divergence between UPKO and USNO was
the timing of the introduction of direct elections. Each of the two parties tended
to shift its position on this issue, depending in part on calculations of its relative
electoral strength at a given time. An important contributing factor to intra-Alli-
ance tensions was the tendency for UPKO and USNO to engage periodically in
raiding each other’s members.
Sabah’s two successive Cabinet crises preceded those of Sarawak.28 Fresh elec-
tions for an enlarged Legislative Assembly in the spring of 1964 had reinforced
USNO’s position as the leading Alliance party controlling the largest number of
legislative seats. USNO then challenged UPKO’s retention of the key post of Chief
Minister, unleashing a power struggle with UPKO. In June a compromise settle-
ment was arranged in Kuala Lumpur under the aegis of Tunku Abdul Rahman.
Sabah’s original Cabinet of eight members was enlarged to ten, the majority of its
old members receiving new Cabinet assignments. A non-party man (but with
UPKO sympathies) was appointed Minister of Natural Resources, the able Attor-
ney-General, Thomas Jayasuriya. Stephens was allowed to continue as Chief
Minister. USNO was temporarily placated with the appointment of Harris bin
Mohammed Salleh to the newly created post of Deputy Chief Minister. A special
feature of this settlement was the mutual pledge taken by the indigenous parties
and SANAP that in the future they would confine their membership recruitment to
their respective ethnic groups; it proved short-lived in practice.
Within six months the Sabah Alliance was confronted with a considerably
graver crisis. Its precipitant was a constitutional hassle with communal overtones.
Tun Mustapha as Head of State refused to take Chief Minister Stephens’ advice
concerning the appointment of a Kadazan, John Dusing, to the important post of
State Secretary, previously held by an expatriate. To UPKO, Tun Mustapha’s
presumed disinterestedness as an apolitical Head of State was suspect, since he
remained deeply involved in USNO affairs. In turn USNO leaders charged that
Stephens had failed to consult his ministerial colleagues on the Dusing appointment,
an obvious handicap for a smoothly functioning coalition Cabinet.
This time a more ambitious mediatory effort was required. In the first dis-
cussions with Tunku Abdul Rahman, initiated by the Sabah Alliance parties, it was
clear that frictions between Mustapha and Stephens had reached the stage that
virtually necessitated the latter’s replacement. The Tunku sponsored a sweeping
reorganization of the Sabah Cabinet. Peter Lo, representing SANAP and presently
serving in the Federal Cabinet, would return to Sabah as its new Chief Minister,
and Stephens would take over his Federal position; a second UPKO leader, Sun-
dang, would be appointed Deputy Chief Minister. Stephens, unwilling for UPKO
to lose the post of Chief Minister, alternatively proposed that Sundang replace him
as Chief Minister. The discussions in Kuala Lumpur temporarily broke down.
Meanwhile USNO leaders in Jesselton, with SANAP’s support threatened to
bring a motion of no-confidence against Stephens in the Sabah legislature, which
28 The details of the succession of cabinet crises in Borneo were obtained from interviews with
politically informed persons in Sabah and Sarawak and newspaper files.
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if passed, would require a Cabinet reorganization. UPKO retaliated by threatening
a similar motion against the Head of State. An ancillary mediatory effort was
launched by a SNAP delegation from Sarawak, led by Ningkan, but a final settle-
ment incorporating the Tunku’s originally proposed changes had to be agreed upon
in Kuala Lumpur. Lo was named Chief Minister, Stephens given a consolatory
Federal Ministry. The crucial factor in resolving the December crisis, distinguishing
it from the June dispute, had been SANAP’s willingness to abandon its earlier
neutrality between USNO and UPKO, and in a deadlock situation join informally
with USNO to depose the UPKO Chief Minister. Subsequently UPKO leaders
publicly expressed resentment over their Alliance partners’ &dquo;ganging up&dquo; against
them. Obviously the second crisis had been settled only by patching up the USNO-
UPKO quarrel without insuring a genuine unity in the Sabah Alliance.
The initial Cabinet crisis of the Sarawak Alliance in May 1965 ostensibly arose
over the Government’s proposed land reform legislation. Actually it involved a
complicated maneuver by a new party alignment to reduce, if not eliminate the
influence of the professedly multi-racial SNAP and SCA, the Chinese member of
the Alliance; in personal terms, the intent was to replace Ningkan as Chief Min-
ister. The new grouping, subsequently labeled the &dquo;Native Alliance,&dquo; comprised
one Iban member, PAPAS, and two Malay parties, BARJASA and PANAS, the
latter having withdrawn from the Alliance in 1963.
In the formation of the Native Alliance the personal equation was extremely
important. In BARJASA the two key leaders were Taib bin Mahmud, its secretary-
general and also a member of the Sarawak Cabinet, and his uncle, Abdul Rahman
Ya’akub, Federal Minister of Land and Mines, whom some observers believed was
the main instigator of a revamped Alliance. A group of &dquo;Young Turks&dquo; in PAPAS,
all members of their Party Executive, Penghulus Jinggut and Francis Umpau,
Jonathan Banggau and Thomas Kana, enlisted the wavering support of their senior
party leader and chairman, the aging but still dynamic Temenggong Jugah, who
was simultaneously chairman of the Sarawak Alliance and Federal Minister for
Sarawak Affairs. The PANAS leader, Abang Othman, was chiefly influential in
securing his party’s adherence to the new Alliance.
Under the British colonial administration, the Natives had enjoyed certain
privileges in land ownership and occupation, with the alien Chinese virtually
excluded from settling whole areas. In early 1964 Chief Minister Ningkan had
enunciated a new land policy, which included a clarification in the legal titles of
Native landholders, many of whom held land under customary rights, and opening
up a certain amount of new land to Chinese farmers. The Government’s aim in
Ningkan’s words was &dquo;to satisfy all sections of the community.&dquo; z9 Nearly a year was
required for intra-Alliance consultations and drafting of complex new Land Bills,
implementing this multi-racial approach. But their introduction in the Council
Negri provoked an outburst of criticism by indigenes, some of whom feared that
many wealthy Chinese towkays would immediately buy up large sections of the
land which would thus be made available, and in this manner gain and perpetuate a
stranglehold on the rural economy. Under heavy pressure the Government with-
29 "Sarawak by the Week," No. 12/64.
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drew its Land Bills, which did not, however, prevent a worsening in the mounting
Alliance crisis. 310
The ensuing tactical moves of Ningkan’s challengers and countermoves made
by the Chief Minister with his Iban and Chinese supporters developed in the follow-
ing sequence: ( 1 ) BARJASA announced its withdrawal from the Alliance, appar-
ently the first step in making Ningkan’s position insupportable; (2) the Chief
Minister quickly sacked BARJASA’s two Cabinet members, including Taib, and
attempted to undercut the new-found unity of the Malay parties, by inviting
PANAS to rejoin the Government; (3) PANAS refused to accept Ningkan’s gam-
bit, maintaining that its entering the Cabinet would undermine Malay unity and
frustrate the incipient Native Alliance; (4) a series of inconclusive consultations
were held in Kuala Lumpur, led by Tun Razak, in which Ya’akub and his &dquo;nativ-
ist&dquo; colleagues in Sarawak initially played an exclusive role, but to which it was
anticipated Ningkan would soon be summoned; (5) Ningkan shrewdly countered
by refusing to go to the Federal capital, where UMNO influence was dominant,
combined with his exploitation of Jugah’s desire to preserve Iban unity, even at the
cost of scrapping the Native Alliance, to which Jugah was ambiguously committed.
The turning point of the crisis, forestalling the imminent disruption of the
Alliance, was a Ningkan-Jugah meeting in early June, held in Sibu, the Third Divi-
sion stronghold of PAPAS. Two imprecisely calculable influences accounted for
Jugah’s shift away from the Native Alliance: his attachment to Iban solidarity and
the counsel of the SCA leadership, with whom Jugah had close ties.
The multiple formula Ningkan and Jugah devised to salvage the Alliance was
as follows: BARJASA’s re-entry into the Cabinet; PANA’s renewed adherence to
the Alliance, sealed by Abang Othman’s admission to the Cabinet; two new PAPAS
members in the Cabinet, including the rebel Umpau; and Ningkan’s retention of
his post as Chief Minister .3&dquo; The Native Alliance was unceremoniously dropped,
enabling the Alliance to maintain its multi-racial character. Finally, Ningkan was
unable to resist underscoring his triumph by requiring BARJASA leaders to pledge
loyalty to him and the Cabinet, and in the subsequently issued order of Cabinet
precedence a presumably chastised Taib was relegated to last place.
A strikingly similar crisis occurred a year later with a slightly different constel-
lation of forces but a radically different result. In June 1966, Ningkan revealed
that a rebel group in the Sarawak Alliance was &dquo;plotting to topple the Govern-
ment&dquo; with the help of &dquo;some people from outside Sarawak,&dquo; an allusion to Ya’akub
and his UMNO colleagues in Kuala Lumpur.32 &dquo;To prevent trouble,&dquo; the Chief
Minister once again sacked the BARJASA Cabinet member (and alleged co-con-
spirator), Taib.
Three significant differences were apparent between the 1966 crisis and its
predecessor: (1) PANAS this time supported the challenged Ningkan; (2) the
30 From this sequence it was inferentially argued by critics of the Native Alliance that the
Land Bills were largely a ploy in what was essentially a power play by the projected
Malay-Iban combination.
" "Sarawak by the Week," No. 25/65.
32 The Straits Budget, June 22, 1966, p. 5.
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PAPAS-BARJASA combination held firm, offsetting a lack of unity between the
Malay parties; and (3) emphatic Federal intervention, led by Tunku Rahman and
Tun Razak, proved decisive in quickly dislodging Ningkan as Chief Minister.
A curious maneuver brought Ningkan down. After threatening to introduce
a motion of no-confidence against the Chief Minister in the Council Negri, a
twenty-man PAPAS-BARJASA delegation, constituting a controlling Council
majority, abruptly departed for Kuala Lumpur. There they insisted that the Tunku,
as head of the National Council of the Malaysian Alliance party, take steps to
remove Ningkan. Ningkan vainly argued that only the Council Negri in Sarawak
could by a negative confidence vote constitutionally oust him. These protestations
were, however, brushed aside, as the Tunku shortly announced that the Alliance
Council in the Federal capital had selected another Iban, Penghulu Tawi Sli, a
hitherto obscure chairman of a local council, to replace Ningkan. Jugah’s pointed
desertion of Ningkan, insuring united PAPAS action under the &dquo;Young Turks,&dquo;
doomed a counter-strategy based either on Iban solidarity or insistence on autono-
mous state action.
The future of the Bornean Alliances was highly problematical. Between 1963-
66 the critical national emergency, with Borneo as the major war front, stimulated
a certain cohesiveness in these coalitions. With the end of Indonesian confronta-
tion and departure of the British defense troops, the stark necessity of maintaining
a modicum of national unity was less compelling. The pending direct elections in
Sabah would define a new power ratio between UPKO and USNO and probably
determine the fate of the Sabah Alliance.33 In Sarawak the staying power of an
Iban-Malay combination was the crucial factor in maintaining its Alliance. In both
states the first three years had established the primacy of the Federal Alliance lead-
ership in making basic personnel decisions for the embattled Bornean Alliances, with
a concomitant decline in the relative power of non-Muslim indigenous political
groupings, more marked thus far in Sabah than Sarawak. Indeed a trend toward
a Malaysianization of the Bornean Alliances appeared the most likely future devel-
opment. But the racially fragmented societies in Borneo and the inevitable expand-
ing influence of the Bornean Chinese argued against the viability of crudely
UMNO-centered political structures in either Sarawak or Sabah.
33 Subsequent to the completion of this article, direct elections for the Sabah Legislative
Assembly were held in April 1967. Since USNO and UPKO could not agree in advance
in the allocation of seats between the two parties, they conducted what were euphemis-
tically described as "friendly" contests in 21 out of 32 constituencies. USNO won 14
seats, UPKO 12. The SCA, with whom USNO had collaborated during the campaign,
held 5 seats, an Independent winning the remaining one. After so bitter a campaign,
USNO and UPKO proved unable to form a new state Cabinet, and UPKO formally
assumed the role of Opposition party. Attempts by Federal Alliance leaders to restore
Alliance unity in Sabah have thus far failed.
